Why does Trump want Greenland? Why has Greenland become essential in international security? In this policy brief, I discuss just this – The geostrategic role of Greenland through American, Russian and Chinese presence in the High North, the significance of this to NATO, and the future of Greenland in light of Trump’s Greenland-bid.
Greenland in the Geostrategic Context
With geopolitical tensions rising, Greenland has become a strategic priority, not only for America, Russia and China, but also for NATO. With the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, increasing collaboration between China and Russia in the High North, and the accelerating impacts of climate change, the geostrategic importance of Greenland has resurfaced. Now, the island has become a key area for geopolitical competition between America, Russia and China, sparking debates across the international security landscape.
America, Russia and China in Greenland
Trump’s renewed interest in Greenland has reemphasised its geostrategic importance for the US, being vital to its defence against Russia. For the US, Greenland is essential for its missile defence and space surveillance. The US presence at Pituffik Space Base is critical to US national security, being responsible for the US military’s northernmost space installation and the world’s northernmost deep-water seaport, hosting a number of subordinate squadrons. The 821st Space Base Group enables force protection, space superiority and scientific research by providing a platform for arctic training, international scientific research and environmental programs. The 12th Space Warning Squadron operates the ballistic missile early-warning system, being responsible for missile warning, missile defence, and space domain awareness. Detachment 1 of the 23rd Space Operations Squadron provides telemetry, tracking and commanding operations to the United States and allied government satellite programs. This presence gives a strategic upper hand for the US in the region, a key factor behind Trump´s Greenland-bid, being primarily based on securing American military presence as well as denying Russian and Chinese presence in the High North.
Russia, which owns 40% of the Arctic Coastline, has the largest Arctic territory and the most developed regional military presence of all the Arctic nations. Russia has invested heavily in its Arctic military footprint, particularly on submarine monitoring and missile system targeting, and wider infrastructure and technology investment in the region. Russia is proactive in military activity around Greenland, committed to increasing its air and naval power in the Arctic Circle by establishing new bases in the Arctic region, as well as reactivating ones that fell into disuse after the Cold War. Additionally, the Kola Peninsula holds its Northern fleet and submarine-launched ballistic missile force, being its leading Arctic military command body. Currently, Russia patrols the Arctic seas with nuclear submarines, while a growing fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers projects Kremlin power across the region, ensuring continuous passability of the Northeast Passage, the shortest route between Europe and Asia. This military presence symbolises Kremlin’s aim to achieve naval superiority in the High North, posing a serious threat to the region, including Greenland.
China has shown increasing interest in Greenland, especially in the exploitation of natural resources. Since 2013, China’s presence and investment in Greenland’s natural resource arena have gradually become more visible, working more with Greenland on mining projects and becoming the largest shareholder of Greenland Minerals. Additionally, China operates three icebreakers (Xuelong, Xuelong 2, and Zhong Shan Da Xue Ji Di), enabling its dual civil-military research efforts in the Arctic, as well as promoting its Polar Silk Road through infrastructure investments and bilateral partnerships. In recent years, China has collaborated further with Russia on gaining a foothold in the region, involving economic investments and joint military activities. This presence can be seen as a way to expand its geopolitical influence with a dual civil-military purpose, which would affect the status quo in Arctic security.
Now, why does Trump want Greenland? The short answer is Russia and China. The increased cooperation between Russia and China is of serious concern, particularly in the military domain. The two countries have, in the past years, conducted joint military drills, including naval exercises, coast guard patrols and strategic bomber air training. In 2022 and 2023, they held joint naval exercises in the Bering Strait. In 2024, they conducted their first joint Arctic maritime patrol and flew four strategic bombers over the Chukchi Sea and the Bering Sea. This collaboration is a major geopolitical challenge, not only to America but also to NATO.
NATO in the High North
Greenland plays a vital role in NATO’s security framework, being essential in anti-submarine warfare in the High North, particularly in light of the GIUK gap, a critical maritime chokepoint for detecting and deterring adversarial naval activity.
The GIUK Gap is a strategically significant maritime passage located between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom, consisting of a 200-mile stretch of ocean between Greenland and Iceland and a 500-mile gap between Iceland and Scotland. Serving as a central chokepoint in the North Atlantic Ocean by connecting the Arctic Ocean to the Atlantic and facilitating movement between North America and Europe.
Being challenged by Russian and Chinese activity, the GIUK Gap stands as a major strategic concern to NATO. As cooperation between Russia and China is firming up, the importance of securing the sea route stands as critical. The GIUK gap is the access point for Russian military operations in the wider North Atlantic Ocean as most of Russia’s highest quality naval capabilities are deployed in the Northern fleet. The GIUK gap also plays an important role for China’s Belt and Road Initiative, being essential in their Polar Silk Road. Being also challenged by civil-military activity from the two countries, the region is likely to be posed by hybrid threats and other forms of disruption. Trump’s wish to buy Greenland is linked to this, understanding Greenland as essential for deterring Chinese and Russian presence in the area by securing an American foothold, as well as ensuring its military presence at Pituffik Space Base.
There is no doubt that NATO is responding to its geostrategic challenges in the High North. Ever since the Cold War, NATO has made and is making significant strides in revitalising its anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
NATO´s activities in the High North span across surveillance and reconnaissance, combat capability and military exercises. Across air and space, NATO´s capabilities consist of its North Warning System and NATO AWACS, Pituffik Space Base, surveillance in Iceland and satellite monitoring in Canada, US, Norway, Denmark and the UK. Underwater, NATO operates the submarine detection system SOSUS and has increasingly deployed the maritime patrol aircraft P-8 Poseidon. The Alliance is also making further investments in airborne warning and control system planes, reconnaissance aircrafts, unmanned maritime systems, and autonomous underwater drones. In combat capability, NATO maintains military presence through its Northern flank. The naval presence consists of multi-domain anti-submarine warfare operations, SSBN/SSN patrols, and Aegis-equipped ballistic missile defence system destroyers. Air defence relies on Quick Reaction Alert, F35s, Gripens, and P-8 Poseidons supported by integrated Ground Based Air Defence systems (NASAMS and PATRIOT), AWACS surveillance, and strategic bomber deployments. On the ground, the northern flank consists of land warfare forces across Finnmark Land Command and Brigade Nord in Norway, the UK Royal Marines, the US Marine Rotational Force, and Finnish and Swedish defence forces. Furthermore, military exercises such as Joint Viking, Northern Viking, Arctic Challenge, Dynamic Front, Dynamic Mongoose, Trilateral Arctic Defence, and Steadfast Defender are providing essential opportunities for the naval forces to advance their tactical and operational capabilities as well as ensuring the presence of NATO in the High North. Supplemented by allied efforts between the Nordic countries, interoperability and cooperation in the High North are being prioritised and reinforced.
Although facing challenges of securing the GIUK gap, there is no doubt that NATO is bolstering its defence in the High North and will continue to do so.
What’s next for Greenland?
NATO will protect Greenland. NATO has a strategic interest and a treaty obligation to defend its territory in the High North, including Greenland. NATO will thus maintain an appropriate level of presence to protect its Northern flank. As NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently stated, NATO make sure to tackle challenges posed in the High North collectively as an Alliance. With this, NATO has affirmed that it will continue its efforts. What NATO thus need to do further is to ensure interoperability and cooperation in the region, strengthening its Northern flank to tackle those challenges posed in the High North. With this, NATO´s mission in the High North is clear: they must close the GIUK gap and secure its Northern flank. Being a pivotal strategic point, Greenland must be secured, and allies shall defend its territory.
Trump will not invade Greenland. Through Denmark, Greenland is by default a part of NATO, meaning Article 5 is extended to Greenland as an autonomous territory of Denmark, and is an EU Overseas Country and Territory (OCT), which means Greenland can trigger Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty, known as the ‘mutual assistance clause’, to oblige other Member States to come to their aid when under attack.
Greenlanders will not become American. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has affirmed that “Greenland belongs to the Greenlanders,” while Danish Foreign Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen said that the island had no ambition to become a federal state in the United States. Furthermore, Greenland’s reaction to Trump’s comments has been firm and clear. Prime Minister Múte Egede stated that Greenland’s future is for its people to decide, rejecting any external attempts to dictate their course. Supplemented by the emphasis on self-determination in its Foreign, Security, and Defense Strategy 2024 – 2033, Greenlandic leaders have emphasised that any partnerships, whether with the U.S. or other nations, must respect their sovereignty and align with their long-term goals. With this, it is clear that Greenland’s future is not determined by either the US, China or Russia – It is about what Greenlanders want.
Greenland belongs to the People of Greenland.
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